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The Battle of Morgarten in 1315:
An Essential Incident in the Founding of the Swiss State
by
Albert Winkler
Political realities in the German Empire at the beginning of the
fourteenth century were harsh, and communities that wanted to gain or
maintain their autonomy had to deal with serious external threats. Most
frequently, this meant that military success was essential for survival. Many
forces vied for authority, influence, and domination over the regions that
formed the Swiss Confederation, which later developed into the modem
state of Switzerland. The largest threat to Swiss sovereignty in this period
was factions of nobles, most importantly the house of Habsburg, which
were expanding their control over the region. By the early fourteenth
century, the states of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden had been cooperating
with each other for decades to resist outside forces, and their resolve to
retain their autonomy was severely tested in 1315 when a large Habsburg
army came to plunder and subjugate these states. The sovereignty of the
Swiss republics was clearly at stake, and the significant victory in the battle
of Morgarten meant that they would survive and continue to develop their
own national expression. 1 This success probably kept the modem cantons
of Switzerland from being little more than the nearby Austrian provinces of
the Voralberg and Tirol. The achievement at Morgarten was also significant
in a social sense because it was an early victory of free peasants, which
allowed them to keep their liberties and independence in the face of
challenges from the feudal forces that attempted to control them. 2 This
1
Morgarten has attracted much scholarly attention. Important studies include, Carl
Amgwerd, "Die Schlacht und das Schlachtfeld von Morgarten," Mitteilungen des
Historischen Vereins des Kantons Schwyz 49 (1951): 1-222; Bruno Meyer, "Die Schlacht
am Morgarten: Verlauf der Schlacht und Absichten der Parteien," Schweizerische Zeitschrift
far Geschichte 16 ( 1966): 129-79; and Wilhelm Sidler, Die Schlacht am Morgarten (Zurich:
Orel! FtiBli, 1910).
2
Collections of primary sources on the battle include: Theodor von Liebenau, ed. "Berichte
tiber die Schacht am Morgarten," Mitteilungen des Historischen Ve reins des Kantons Schwyz
3 (1884): 1-86 and W. Oechsli Die Anfange der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft: zur
sechsten Sakularfeier des ersten ewigen Bundes vom 1. August 1291 (Zurich: Ulrich & Co.,

3
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article will address the development of the early Swiss to 1315 and
demonstrate how political and social realities led to war. This essay will
also analyze the battle of Morgarten by a careful use of the primary sources
to clarify many aspects of the engagement.
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden were the first members of the Swiss
Confederation. Often referred to as the "Forest States" or "Forest Cantons"
(Waldstiitte), these small communities were struggling for their autonomy
as they faced external threats. During much of the late Middle Ages, Uri
and Schwyz were part of the Zurich district over which the Habsburg family
had authority. While the people of these states were largely free peasants
and often chose their own leaders, the Habsburgs still held judicial powers
over them and could arbitrate or pass judgment on their activities, especially
dealing with foreign relations. A major step toward self-rule for the Swiss
was the granting of charters of independence (Freibrief or Freheitsbrie/) for
both Uri and Schwyz by the Hohenstaufen Emperors of Germany, Henry
VII and Frederick II. Henry conferred this concession to Uri in 1231 and
Frederick gave it to Schwyz in 1240. These endowments affirmed that the
states were under the authority of the Emperor (Reichsunmittelbar or
Reichsfrei) making them independent from the local feudal powers
including the Habsburgs, but this sovereignty had to be put into practice,
and many issues remained unresolved. 3 While Uri retained this status,
Schwyz and the Habsburg family engaged in a lengthy contest relating to
judicial authority, even though that state controlled much of its domestic
affairs, and it became the most militant power in resisting the Habsburg
threat to the independence of the Forest States.
More than a century later, the Bernese chronicler, Conrad Justinger,
presented quaint details on the oppression of the people of Schwyz by the
Habsburg rulers. Justing er claimed the Habsburg overlords (amtlute) placed
over the peasants acted in a "completely outrageous" (gar frevenlich)
manner by abusing "pious people, wives, daughters, and young women, and
[the overlords] wanted to force their immoral desires [on them]," causing
the people to rebel. 4 While this account certainly made the Schwyzers
1891 ), pp. 206*-19*. The * designates the page numbers of sources in the appendix.
3

Wilhelm Oechsli ed. Quellen zur Schweizergeschichte (Zurich: Schulthess, 1918), pp. 40,
41.
4
Conrad Justinger, Die Berner-Chronik (Bern: Wyss, 1871), p. 46. "Ouch warent die
amptliite gar frevenlich gen fromen liit, wiben, tochtern und jungfrowen, und wolten iren
mutwillen mit gewalt triben, daz aber die erben lute die lengen nit vertragen mochten; und
sassten sich also wider die amptliite." See also, Richard Feller and Edgar Bonjour,
Geschichtschreibung der Schweiz: vom Spatmittelalter zur Neuzeit (Basel: Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, 1979), pp. 7-11. Justinger wrote near the year 1420.
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appear to be virtuous and innocent victims, Justinger clearly exaggerated.
The communities of Schwyz commonly elected their own local leaders, and
there were few if any Habsburg overseers nearby to abuse the people on
such a personal level.
The contest between the Swiss and the Habsburgs also dealt with
personal liberties because the peasants were trying to get and maintain
broader privileges. At that time, there were sharp distinctions between the
peasants who were free and unfree. The serfs were held in bondage, they
owned no land, were tied to the manor, and could even be sold with it. They
owed service without payment to the landowner, and the lord controlled
local justice in the manorial court. Serfs even had to get permission from
the lord to marry. Critically, the nobles held the right to provide military
protection, and those in bondage could not perform this vital function. The
authority to defend the state was a necessary step toward individual liberties
and the independence of society and the state. In fact, the right to bear arms
was often the most obvious privilege which separated the free from the
unfree. The free peasants could also leave the service of the landowner and
appeal to higher courts thus circumventing local manorial justice to look for
fairer judgments to their petitions. 5 The peasants coveted these rights, and
those who enjoyed them wanted to keep and protect them from any threat.
The people of Schwyz enjoyed more freedoms than those of the other
Forest States, but the residents of Uri also maintained many liberties even
though some of them owed loyalty to local landowners and church men.
The opening of the St. Gotthard Pass over the Alps, probably in 1236, made
Uri an important station on a major trade route, and the community charged
tolls and transportation fees, enhancing its wealth and importance. In
contrast, much of the land in Unterwalden was owned by persons living
outside the area, and comparatively few free peasants lived there. While
many of these people still owed service to lords and church estates, they
were clearly agitating for liberties such as those enjoyed by their sister
states nearby. 6
The Habsburg family tried to assert control over Schwyz and the other
Forest States by a policy of encirclement. One method was to control trade.
Count Rudolf III von Habsburg, the Silent (der Schweigsame), constructed
the fortress of Neuhabsburg from 1241 to 1244 on the shores of Lake
Luzern on a prominence between Luzern and Ktissnacht to control
5

Friedrich von Wy8, "Die Freien Bauem, Freiamter, Freigerichte und die Vogteien der
Ostschweiz im spateren Mittelalter," Zeitschriftfar schweizerisches Recht 18 (1873): 19-184
and Paul Schweizer, "Die Freiheit der Schwyzer," Jahrbuchfar Schweizerische Geschichte
10 (1885): 2-25.
6
Sidler, Morgarten, pp. 32-41.
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commerce by that route. The Emperors Rudolf I von Habsburg, who
reigned from 1273 to 1291, and his son, Albrecht I, who ruled from 1297
to 1307, followed this policy. Wielding the combined power of the
Habsburg faction and the Imperial prerogatives, they extended their
influence on the approaches to the Forest States by acquiring literally
dozens of towns, areas, and courts by many means, including inheritance
and purchase, thus effectively controlling access to the Forest States from
the east, north, and west. Among the areas gained by Rudolf was the city of
Zug, from which the Habsburg army would march on Schwyz in 1315.
Equally important was the purchase of Interlaken by Albrecht in 1306 that
was also an assembly point from which the Habsburgs launched their attack
on Unterwalden at the same time as the invasion of Schwyz. Also
significant was Rudolf's extension of control over the monastery of
Einsiedeln in 1283. 7 The people of Schwyz and the Forest States took the
threats very seriously, and began a vigorous policy in 1293 of small-scale
warfare to thwart Habsburg interests. 8 During wars and other international
crises, these impediments threatened the Swiss states.
The Forest States also looked to each other for mutual support and
protection politically and militarily .9 An undated document, written perhaps
between 1244 and 1252, mentioned an agreement between Luzem and the
towns ofBuochs and Stans, both in Unterwalden. 10 Pope Innocent IV wrote
a letter on 28 Aug. 1247 condemning a pact between Schwyz, Luzem, and
Samon, a town in Unterwalden. The Holy Father was supporting a plea by
Count Rudolf III von Habsburg who claimed that he owned these areas, and
he feared they were operating autonomously. Innocent angrily criticized this
agreement because it aided Emperor Frederick II with whom the Pope was
then at war. 11

7

Sidler, pp. 44, 48-54.
Ibid., pp. 114-5.
9
On the question of early treaties among the Forest States, see W. Oechsli, Die Anfange der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft:; two works by Bruno Meyer, Die Altesten
Eidgenossischen Bunde: Neue Untersuchungen uber die Anfange der Schweizerischen
Eidgenossenschaft (Zurich: Rentsch, 1938); and "Die Entstehung der Eidgenossenschaft:
Der Stand der heutigen Anschauungen," Schweizerische Zeitschrift far Geschichte 2 ( 1952):
153-205. See also Karl Meyer "Der Ursprung der Eidgenossenschaft," Zeitschrift far
schweizerische Geschichte 21(1941) 3: 285-652.
0
' J. E. Kopp, ed. Urkunden zur Geschichte der eidgenossischen Bunde (Lucern: Meyer,
1835), pp. 2-3. Kopp reproduced the document and presented his case for its date in a
footnote.
""Breve des Papstes Innocenz IV. gegen Schwyz, Sarnen und Luzern. Lyon 28 August
1247" as cited in Wilhelm Oechsli, ed. Quellenbuch zur Schweizergeschichte (Zurich:
Schulthess, 1918), pp. 43-4. This is a translation of the document from Latin into German.
8
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Map of the Forest States by Dan McClellan
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Future members of the Swiss Confederation entered into at least one
agreement in 1291. Since the Federal Charter (Bundesbrief) of August 1291
may be a forgery, 12 the first authentic pact of that year was endorsed by
Zurich, Uri, and Schwyz on 16 Oct. 1291. These states designed the
agreement to last three years, but it became invalid when the Habsburgs
defeated Zurich in 1292, and the city had to come to terms with its
adversaries, losing its ability to act independently. 13 Zurich later sent troops
to support the Habsburg forces at the battle of Morgarten. Ironically, the
best interest of the city in the long term rested with a victory of its
adversaries in that engagement.
Long before the encounter at Morgarten, the men of Schwyz
demonstrated significant military ability, and the statements by early
historians of the battle that the Schwyzers were either "defenseless"
(inermem) or "untrained at arms" (armis inexercitatam) were incorrect. 14
The Emperor Rudolf I hired mercenaries from that state, and these men
participated in the siege of Besanc;on in 1289. The men from Schwyz were
"accustomed to moving rapidly in the mountains," and they dealt a decisive
blow to the city defenders in an impressive feat of arms by "attacking down
a mountain." 15 The men of Schwyz again showed this skill in maneuvering
in steep terrain before the battle of Morgarten, and they also won that
contest by an attack downhill. Rudolf was so impressed "that the king
[Rudolf] awarded them [the Schwyzers] a red banner of the Holy Roman
Empire; that is all the emblems ... of the holy martyrs of our Lord Jesus
Christ." 16 This was a red banner with a white Christian symbol on it, which

12

See Roger Sablonier, "Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft im 15. Jahrhundert: Staatlichkeit,
Politik und Selbstverstandnis," in Die Enstehung der Schweiz: vom Bundesbrief 1291 zur
Nationalen Geschichtskultur des 20. Jahrhunderts (Schwyz: Historischer Verein des
Kantons Schwyz, 1999). Christoph Pfister, Bern und die a/ten Eidgenossen: Die Entstehung
der Schwyzer Eidgenossenschaft im Lichte der Geschichtskritick, (Norderstedt: Dillum,
2006) and his "Der Bundesbrief von 1291: Kritik einer Gefalschten Urkunde,"
www .dillum.dh/htrnl/bundesbrief_l 29 l_kritik.htm
13
"Rat und Burger von Zurich schliessen mit Landammannem und Landleuten von Uri und
Schwyz ein dreijahriges Bundnis, einer gegen jedermann zu helfen, 1291 Oktober 16."
Urkundenbuch derStadt und La.ndschaft Zurich (Zurich: Hohr, 1888-[ 1957]), 6: 150-1. See
also Oechsli, Quellenbuch, pp. 49-50 and Anton Largiader, Geschichte von Stadt und
Landschaft Zurich (Zurich: Rentsch, 1945), p. 86.
14
The quotes are from Peter von Zittau and Johann von Victring respectively as cited in
Liebenau, "Berichte," pp. 23 and 24.
15
"soliti currere in montanis" and "descendentes montem irruerunt," Mathias von
Neuenburg, Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, Adolf Hofmeister, ed. (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1955), p. 41.
16
"daz inen der kung gab an ir roten paner daz heilig rich, daz ist alle waffen ... der heiligen
marter unseres herrenjesu Christi," Justinger, Berner-Chronik, p. 46.
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the Schwyzers carried at Morgarten, and red and white later became the
colors of the entire Swiss Nation. 17
The attacks by the Schwyzers on the monastery of Einsiedeln further
demonstrated their martial abilities shortly before the battle of Morgarten.
A controversy over control of the monastery at Einsiedeln led to increased
tensions between the Habsburgs and Schwyz because that noble family
provided protection for the convent. In a "boundary dispute"
(Marchenstreit), Schwyz and Einsiedeln had contested the ownership of
important lands since the tenth century, and the controversy was only
solved in 1394 when Schwyz achieved formal control of the religious
community. The people of Schwyz believed that much of the wealth of
Einsiedeln belonged to them, which justified taking the monastery's
goods. 18
In 1307, the Schwyzers
launched a series of assaults on the
cloister, and the official list of
complaints (Klagerodel) about
these raids, written by the monks
in 1311, gave insights into how
the men of Schwyz waged war.
The men of Schwyz broke into
stalls and plundered storage
facilities taking food, horses, and
cattle, and they also killed a few
monks while abusing others. Even
though the attackers assaulted
largely defenseless friars, the
Schwyzers deployed their forces
with careful military efficiency,
and they almost always came at
night meaning they were able to
march and deploy after dark. Of
the thirty attacks listed, five
involved 100 men, two included Men of Schwyz taking cattle from the
200 men, and six contained 300 monastery of Einsiedeln during the Border
Dispute.
men. The men were under military
leadership and came with banners
flying. Two officers were often over each group of 100, and the overall

I

17

For an extensive work on Swiss flags see, A. and B. Bruckner, eds. Schweizer Fahnenbuch,
(St. Gallen: Zollikofer, 1942).
18
Andreas Riggenbach, Der Marchenstreit zwischen Schwyz und Einsiedeln und die
Entstehung der Eidgenossenschaft (Zurich: Fretz und Wasmuth, 1965).
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leader of the state (Landammann) was frequently in charge of the raids.
These numbers indicated the Schwyzers used tactical units of 100 men, but
they also deployed smaller groups because the monks observed detachments
of 20 and 30 men on one occasion. These smaller formations indicated a
greater tactical flexibility because units of 100 were probably more
cumbersome to deploy under various circumstances. 19
Rudolf von Radegg, a monk at Einsiedeln, witnessed one of the most
significant raids on the monastery on the night of 6 and 7 January 1314 and
wrote an account of it. The men of Schwyz marched from their homes for
hours on a route that took them past the mountain of Morgarten in the dark
and cold of the winter night. This force included some men on horseback
and was the entire military strength of the state. The men of Schwyz
attacked at midnight and showed great military efficiency. They divided
their forces and surrounded the religious community, making sure that no
one could escape, and advanced simultaneously to seize the monastery. The
Schwyzers took much that was valuable, including books and cattle, and
burned every document they could find, obviously hoping to destroy
anything that might support the monks ' claims to ownership of the land.
Foreseeing this possibility, the abbot had hidden the most important
manuscripts before the Schwyzers attacked, and these significant items
survived. The troops took nine monks captive to Schwyz including Rudolf
where they remained under the hospitality of a local priest until the
Habsburgs negotiated their release eleven weeks later. 20 These prisoners
were noblemen, and they were probably freed on the payment of a ransom.
While attacking defenseless monks required little military skill, these
actions provide valuable insights into the ability of the men of Schwyz to
deploy before the battle of Morgarten. The route from Schwyz to Einsiedeln
led past the road going to Zug along the base of the Morgarten mountain.
As was the case in 1315 when the troops deployed for the battle, it would
have been easy for the Schwyzers to tum onto the road to Zug, follow it a
short distance, and take positions on the slopes of the hill. Equally
significant, the men of Schwyz had shown they were skilled at coordinated
efforts at night and in cold weather, which were essential abilities in their
victory at Morgarten.
The attacks on Einsiedeln were clearly provocative to the Habsburgs,
and this aggressiveness was part of Schwyz' s foreign policy that led to war.
The Schwyzers had also become more hostile to Einsiedeln because the
19
"KJagerodel: 1311 , nach Marz 14-Juni 19," Der Geschichtsfreund: Mitteilungen des
Historischen Vereins der fiinf Orte Luzem , Uri, Schwyz, Underwalden Ob und Nid dem
Wald und Zug 43(1888): 345-59.
20
Rudolf von Radegg, "Uberfall Einsiedelns <lurch die Schwizer. 6.-7. Januar 1314," as cited
in Oechsli, Quellenbuch, (1901 ), pp. 261 - 73.
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attempts at arbitration had gone against them. Finally, Gerhard von Bevar
(ruled 1307-18), the Bishop of Constance, placed the interdict on Schwyz
for its belligerence and for its refusal to pay compensation for damages. But
Church sanctions changed little politically, and the people of that state were
so outraged by the ban that the bishop's emissaries dared not read the
official statement in Schwyz for fear of violence. 21
The Schwyzers also prepared for hostilities by building border defenses.
Uri's location between the other two Forest States left it largely
invulnerable to direct assault, but Schwyz and Unterwalden were subject to
invasion.The mountainous terrain restricted the avenue of approach to these
two states, and their people secured various routes of possible attack by
building border fortifications "walls and trenches" called Letzi, from letze
(border defense). 22
The Schwyzers built these defenses shortly before the battle. Most
likely, these people constructed the Letzi at Rothenthurm in 1310 to protect
the route from Einsiedeln. Rudolf von Radegg mentioned the wall at
Rothenthurm when he was taken captive to Schwyz in 1314. "We came to
the place where the defensive walls had been constructed." 23 The
fortifications there included a wall approximately 1 meter (3 feet) thick and
3 to 5 meters (10 to 16 feet) high. The barrier was about 400 to 450 meters
(440 to 500 yards), and it also supported two towers. 24 The Schwyzers build
the defenses at Brunnen near the same time because they were in place in
1315 before the battle. These barriers protected against potential attacks by
land and by boat across Lake Luzern and included palisades, which were
poles driven into the shores of the lake to block landings by water. The
walls on land were also about 10 to 16 feet (3 to 5 meters) high and 3 feet
(1 meter) wide. 25

21

Sidler, pp. 62, 115.
Stefan Sonderegger, "Der Kampf an der Letzi: Zur Typologie des spatmittelalterlichen
Abwehrkampfes im Bereich von voralpinen Landwehren," Revue internationale d'histoire
militaire 65 ( 1988): 77-8. The contemporary historian, Johannes von Winterthur also called
them "walls and trenches" "muris etfossatis" Johannes von Winterthur, Johannis Vitodurani
Chronicon: Die Chronik des Minoriten Johannes von Winterthur Georg von Wyss
ed.(Ztirich: Hohr, 1856), p. 71.
23
"Venimus, in quo sunt moenia structa, loco." Rudolf von Radegg as cited in A. Ntischeler,
"Die Letzinen in der Schweiz," Mittheilungen der Antiquarischen Gesellschaft in Zurich 18
(1872): 13.
24
Jost Btirgi, "Die Letzinen der Urkantone: ein Verteidigungssystem aus der Zeit der
Bundesgrtindung," Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins des Kantons Schwyz 75 (1983):
35.
25
Sidler, pp. 117-8.
22
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Border defenses at Rothenthurm as they appeared in 1790.

The defenses at Arth were among the most extensive. In 1314, the
Schwyzers built two lines of defenses, in the lower part of the village
(Niederdorj), in and near Lake Zug to defend against any attacks by land or
water. They constructed palisades in the shores of the lake that were
roughly 1000 meters (1100 yards) in length, and the walls on land were
probably 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) long. 26 The barriers on land were
described as being about 12 feet high (12 Schuhe hoch) and 3 feet thick (3
Schuhe dick). They were well constructed out of stone and resembled the
wall of a castle, complete with a trench, 9 meters (30 feet) wide and 2
meters (6 feet) deep, dug along the front of the position to enhance its
effectiveness. The tops of the walls were irregular in configuration and
included merlons, which were solid positions for protection, and
crenellations, that were the empty spaces between the merlons from which
shots could be fired. At either end of these barricades, the natural obstacle
of dense forests helped protect this position from flank attack. Believing in
defense in depth, the Schwyzers also constructed another line of obstacles
in the upper village (Oberdorf) of Arth at the same time. 27

26

27

Map facing page 125 in Sidler and Biirgi, "Die Letzinen der Urkantone," p. 43 .
Biirgi, pp. 39-48.
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The people of Unterwalden also built defensive positions at this time,
mostly to protect them from attack across Lake Luzem. They constructed
the extensive palisades and walls defending Stansstad, Buochs, and
Beckenried about 1315, all on the shores of the lake. 28 These extensive
fortifications constructed shortly before the battle of Morgarten
demonstrated that the people of Schwyz and Unterwalden, which were poor
countries with small populations, made significant sacrifices in funds and
effort to protect their lands from attack. Despite these impressive endeavors,
the Schwyzers either overlooked an important avenue of approach or simply
had too few resources to buttress it because they had failed to fortify the
road leading from Lake Aegeri (Agerisee) past the Morgarten Mountain into
Schwyz. This oversight gave the Habsburg army a relatively unobstructed
avenue of attack in 1315. The Schwyzers fortified this point of entrance at
Hauptsee in 1322 seven years after the battle. 29
The military ability of the Forest States was related to their manpower
because strength was partially a function of the number of men available for
service. The population of these states at that time cannot be determined
precisely, but each likely contained several thousand persons at most.
Certainly, no more than one quarter of the total population was an adult,
physically-fit male, and a reasonable estimate of the troop strength of
Schwyz, was 1200 to 1500 men. Military service began at age sixteen and
continued until the infirmities of old age precluded martial activities,
usually by age sixty. Sixteen was also the age at which young men were
legally adults. 30 The men of the Forest States had no uniforms at this time,
and they wore their usual peasant's clothing on campaigns. But they had
white crosses sewn into their clothing, either the shirt or the pants or both,
to distinguish them from their enemies.
There were hardly any social distinctions between the men in the army
of Schwyz because the community was comprised almost entirely of
peasants, and few if any knights participated in the battle on their side. In
his account of the battle, Justinger referred to groups of men he called
achter and einunger who fought for Schwyz. Some historians have assumed
he meant men who were shock troops they called "banished" (Verbannten),
who led the Schwyzers into battle. These men were supposedly "criminals"
(Verbrecher) or "convicts" (Straflinge). This interpretation is an error
derived from a misunderstanding of the terms achter and einunger in
28

Niischeler, "Letzinen," pp. 7-17, [61]. See also Sidler, pp. 116-30.
Jost Biirgi, pp. 29-55.
30
Oechsli, p. 230. All men of Schwyz aged "sixteen years and above" (mansnamen xvi yarn
alt und darob was) served indicating this was the age of military obligation. Hans Friind, Die
Chronik des Hans Frii.nd, Landschreiber zu Schwytz Christian Immanuel Kind ed. (Chur:
Genge! , 1875), p. 48.
29
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Justinger's account, which seemed to refer to some kind oflawbreaker. 31 In
fact, those terms indicated these men were not criminals but were the best,
bravest, and most experienced troops available. 32 No doubt, such skillful
warriors were placed in the most critical point in the battle.
The principal weapon wielded by the men of the Forest States was the
halberd, a variation of the battle ax, that had an iron ax blade with a sharp
point on it. Often there was also a hook on the side opposite to the ax blade.
This metal accessory was attached to a wooden shaft 5 to 8 feet long, and
the weapon was light, versatile, and relatively inexpensive. The device was
used for stabbing and slashing, and, when the hook was available, it could
snag a knight's armor and be used to pull him from his mount. Once on the
ground, a heavily armored cavalryman was out of his element and at a
disadvantage. Johannes von Winterthur wrote that the Schwyzers had these
"very terrible" weapons with which they could cut up their heavily-armored
enemies into pieces as though "with a razor." 33 The Schwyzers also wore
shoes with iron spikes affixed to them that made walking on the steep and
slippery slopes of mountains much easier giving them a considerable
advantage over their enemies on foot and horseback who had no such
devices. 34
Some of the Swiss carried other weapons including daggers, but few if
any had crossbows or other arms that could shoot projectiles, yet they often
opened battle by throwing stones allowing them to do damage at a distance.
The Habsburg knights on horseback and the foot soldiers who accompanied
them wielded the typical weapons used by well-equipped armies at that time
including swords, spears, and daggers. They also had defensive armament
such as helmets, shields, and chain mail pants and shirts. 35 The Habsburg
army was clearly formidable, and its soldiers were "the strongest, best
chosen, most battle experienced, most skillful, and most fearless [men]." 36
31

Justinger, p. 47.
Liebenau, pp. 10-15 and Sidler, pp. 182-4.
33
Johannes von Winterthur, Chronik, pp. 72-3. "Illa apellate helnbartam, valde terribilia,
quibus adversarios firmissime armatos quasi cum novacula diviserunt et in frusta
conciderunt."
34
lbid, p. 72. "Instrumentis pedicis et ferreis induit quibus faciliter gressum vel gradum in
terrafixerant in montibus quantumcumque proclivis; inimicus et inimicorum equis minime
pedes suos sistere valentibus."
35
Philipp MUiler, "Morgarten: ein Beitrag zur Waffentechnik," Mitteilungen des Historischen
Vereins des Kantons Schwyz 88 (1996): 23-40. Two works by Hugo Schneider also found
in the Mitteilungen, "Die Bewaffnung zur Zeit der Schlacht am Morgarten,"58 ( 1965):
37-49 and "Schwert und Dolch aus der Zeit der Schlacht am Morgarten, 1315 " 57 (1964):
137-46.
36
Johannes van Winterthur, p. 71 , "miliciam robustissimam et electissimam et ad
pungnandum peritissimam et intrepidissimam."
32
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A Swiss with a halberd pulling a knight from his mount by E. Van Muyden

The conflict between the Forest States and the Habsburgs became part
of a war for the throne of Germany. In 1313, the Emperor Henry VII died,
and ambitious and powerful nobles soon vied for his position. Louis IV of
Bavaria (Ludwig the Bavarian) won this contest and was elected to the
throne in October 1314, but the Habsburg faction, led by Frederick I, the
Handsome (der Schone), disputed the election, and civil war ensued.
Frederick's younger brother, Leopold, supported his sibling's candidacy,
while the Forest States sought to weaken Habsburg influence by sustaining
Louis. The campaigning between Louis and Frederick in 1315 was
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol44/iss3/10
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indecisive, but late in the year Leopold decided to invade the Forest States.
The supporters of Louis had already slowed their activities as winter
approached, but there was still time for Leopold to wage a rapid campaign
before the onset of harsh weather. A quick, decisive expedition against the
Swiss would remove the threat from the Forest States, and the subsequent
plundering of their lands would provide needed supplies and funds to help
sustain the Habsburg war effort. 37 In fact as Duke Leopold' s army
advanced, his men carried "ropes and cords" (restes et Junes) with which to
lead away captured cattle. 38
Frederick and Leopold led a large army in the summer of 1315 believed
to be 20,000 men on foot and 1300 well-armed knights on horseback. 39 As
allies of the Habsburg faction, contingents of men from Zurich, Luzem,
Zug, and Glarus accompanied them. 40 Victory seemed assured for Duke
Leopold, if he could bring his impressive force to bear on the relatively
small number of Swiss troops. The best hope the Swiss states had for
success was to defeat the Habsburg army before it could be fully deployed
against them.
Leopold divided his forces for a two-pronged attack on the Forest States
from opposite directions. Count Otto von Strassberg led one of these
advances, and he assembled his force at Interlaken to strike at U nterwalden
from the southwest over the Brtinig Pass. On the same day, 15 November
1315, the Duke led another army to invade Schwyz from the north. Striking
at the Forest States from two directions at the same time seemed to be a
good strategy because the Swiss would have difficulty meeting such threats,
but the Swiss enjoyed interior lines of communication, which meant they
could concentrate their forces on one army, and, if victorious, turn their
attention to the other. The size of the force the Duke led against Schwyz
was probably half the number of the two armies, and it included roughly
9,000 men on foot and on horseback. Among these were about 2000
mounted knights. 4 1
Fortunately, the badly-outnumbered Schwyzers received reinforcements
from their allies. Uri faced no immediate danger, since the enemy marched
only directly on Unterwalden and Schwyz, so Uri sent troops to the other
states. Unterwalden sent men to aid Schwyz as well, even though an army
also advanced on them, believing the defense of Schwyz was critical. The
37

Alois Niederstatter, Die Herrschaft Osterreich: Furst und Land im Spiitmittelalter (Wien:
Ueberreuter, 2001), pp. 120-1.
38
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 71.
39
Ibid. pp. 70-1. "circa mille trecentos equites galeatos vel ultra et circa XX milia peditum."
40
Justinger, p. 47.
41
Recent historians often accept the number of 9000 men among whom were 2000 knights.
Sidler, p. 153 and Hans Rudolf Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, (Bern : Francke, 1962), p. 8.
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contingents sent to Schwyz numbered 600, and these additional forces
played a key role in the battle. The combined Swiss forces reportedly
numbered 2000 men. 42

Battle of Morgarten by Diebold Schilling (the older) drawn in
1485. Leopold's court jester is depicted at the left.

Conrad Justinger told a quaint story about Leopold's plans that
illuminated a potential problem with them. A court jester or fool (narre ),
later believed to be Kuony (Kuoni) von Stacken, accompanied the army,
and Leopold asked how the plans pleased him. He answered, "not well."
When asked to explain, the jester responded, "because everyone has
counseled on how you will go into the land, [but] no one has explained how
you will retum." 43 This story was probably apocryphal, but it indicated a
42

Justinger, p. 47 and Peter von Zittau ''Jere duo millia pugnantium," as cited in Liebenau,
p. 23.
43
Justinger, p. 47, "Nu waz ein narre in dem here, der wart gefraget wie im der rat geviele?
Do sprach er, nit wol; do fragten si in: warumb im ir rate iibel geviele? Do antwurt er und
sprach: darumb daz ir alle geraten hand, wie ir in daz Zant koment, es hat iiwer keiner
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potential weakness in the Duke's plans because no one considered the
possibility of failure and the potential need to escape.
The Swiss planned to ambush the Habsburg army when it advanced, but
a knowledge of when and where these forces would march was critical to
that attempt. When Leopold assembled his troops at Zug on 14 November
1315, he had only two logical directions of approach into Schwyz. He could
either advance along the shores of Lake Zug to attack the defenses at Arth,
or he could march past Lake Aegeri and use the unobstructed road that went
along the slopes of the Morgarten Mountain. Clearly, the route past
Morgarten was the easiest means of approach, and the Schwyzers may have
failed to fortify that area hoping to lure any attacking army into using that
avenue of march, but they had to be completely sure it was used. The early
historians of the battle have suggested that an intermediary or a traitor gave
the Swiss this vital information. Johannes von Winterthur mentioned that
the "count of Toggenburg" (de Toggenburg comitem), identified as
Friedrich von Toggenburg, was a mediator between Schwyz and Leopold
in negotiations to reach some kind of agreement. This effort failed, but
during the mediation, the Schwyzers learned by which direction the
Habsburg army would advance. 44 Conrad Justinger stated that a nobleman
named "von Htinenberg" shot an arrow over the fortifications towards the
Swiss with a note attached to it which read, "defend yourselves at
Morgarten." 45 This man, Hartman von Htinenberg, reportedly held the
people of Schwyz in high esteem.
These stories seemed plausible, but they remained uncertain, and other
explanations were also possible. Clearly, many men knew the route of
march, and Leopold's army may have been unable to keep a secret, meaning
that the intelligence might have leaked out by numerous sources. The
Schwyzers also used reconnaissance to discern their enemy's movements.
A man on horseback could cover many miles in a few hours, rapidly
bringing vital information on the activities of the Habsburg army. As one
chronicler asserted, the men of Schwyz learned of the enemy's approach by
"diligent scouting." 46 These scouts encamped on the road that led past the
Morgarten mountain, and "watched it [the passage] all day and night." 47 The
people of Schwyz established a ruse at Arth to fool Leopold into believing
geraten, wa ir harwider uskoment."
44
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Prescientes autem Switenses, per revelacionem comitis
memorati, se in illa parte aggrendiendos."
45
Justinger, p. 47. "hiitend uch am morgarten."
46
Sebastian Seeman as cited in Liebenau, p. 42. "Speculatorium industria ( qui tum forte ei
in loco peccorum armenta a bestiarum raptu tuebantur) premoniti, in loco memorato
Morgarte ei occurerunt."
47
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Et erant custodientes ea tota die et nocte."
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that their main forces were stationed at that fortified town. The people lit
watch fires on the walls of Arth, and young boys and women remained on
the barricades to give the impression that the walls were defended by men. 48
While the battle plans of Schwyz proved highly effective, the names of
the leaders who made them remain unknown. Konrad von Yberg of Schwyz
led at least two of the attacks on the monastery of Einsiedeln, and W emer
Stauffacher was the leader of the state (Landamman) in 1314, but the
commanders for 1315, when the battle took place, were unrecorded.
However, Stauffacher most likely led the men of Schwyz at Morgarten. The
overall leader of Uri for 1315 was Werner von Attinghusen (Attinghausen)
and the leaders ofUnterwalden that year were Heinrich von Zubon (Zuben)
and Klaus von Wizerlon (WiBerlon). 49
The Habsburg cavalry advanced ahead of the foot soldiers. The
mounted knights were clearly the most formidable part of the army, and the
impressive throw weight of a heavily armored man charging on horseback
was well known. The knights also had great disdain for the lower classes on
foot. These nobleman likely believed they had a score to settle with the
upstart peasants living in Schwyz, who had long resisted Habsburg
domination. The road was probably only wide enough to accommodate two
horses abreast, and the column of men on horseback could have stretched
a few miles along the road. The men on foot followed the advancing
cavalry, and this procession probably stretched for several miles as well.
Additionally, some of the troops came by boat across Lake Aegeri. One
vessel from Aarow (Aarau) held forty-five men. 50 The men of Schwyz and
their allies wisely directed their attack at the knights at the front of the
column. While the entire Habsburg army greatly outnumbered the Swiss,
at the point of engagement, the numbers involved on both sides were
probably about equal. Also, the attack on a mountain road meant that the
knights were incapable of mounting a charge, meaning they had lost their
main advantage in combat.
The Habsburg army marched on Schwyz early in the morning of 15
Nov. 1315, and its progress was aided by the light of the moon that was
only two days past full, but the brightness of the night also assisted the
Swiss when they deployed to meet their adversaries. Leopold's advance was
orderly and well planned despite one serious oversight. Apparently, he
made no effort to reconnoiter the line of march to learn if there were any
48

Peter Villiger as cited in Oechsli, p. 217*. "Aliso hand sy von stundt an sich im ganzen
land versamlet, sind den nachsten gegen den Morgarten gezogen und zu Arth die frowen
Lassen die wacht halten." See also, Rennward Cysat as cited in Liebenau, p. 72.
49
See "Klagerodel," Der Geschichtsfreund, 349-59 and letters to the leaders of Uri, Schwyz,
and Unterwalden as cited in Oechsli, pp. l 97*- 198* and pp. 203 *-204*.
50
Sprenger und Klingenberg as cited in Oechsli, pp. 215-6*.
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unforeseen obstacles on the avenue of approach. Perhaps in his
overconfidence and arrogance, he thought this routine military precaution
was unnecessary. Even a few men on horseback could have brought
Leopold vital information that he was marching into an ambush, and the
Duke soon learned a hard lesson about the grave risks of underestimating
the Swiss.
The Schwyers and their allies deployed on the uphill side of the road,
which led past the Morgarten Mountain. These forces were spread out along
this route, so they could strike a large section of the approaching column
simultaneously. The Habsburg army marched along this road in the
predawn light of morning, when the Swiss struck. In one of the earliest
accounts of the action, the attackers, having allowed the Duke to advance
into a trap, immediately "sprang forward from the mountain just like
mountain goats, throwing stones, killing most [of the defenders], who were
in no way able to defend [themselves] or to escape." 51
The tactic of throwing stones at the beginning of an attack was often
used by the Swiss early in their history, which was the case later, in 1339
at the Battle of Laupen. 52 The stratagem of hurling stones was a crude form
of fighting because the accuracy of thrown rocks was poor, and this tactic
could only be used at very close range. Likely, stones were used by the
Swiss who had few weapons cable of killing at a distance such as
crossbows. The rocks thrown at Morgarten could have helped confuse the
enemy and might have done some damage, but this barrage of stones was
of short duration, and the Swiss soon advanced to meet their adversaries.
The Swiss attacked rapidly on the slippery slopes using their iron
footgear for traction, but the Habsburg forces were caught completely out
of their element, and the initial attack swept through the knights so rapidly
that they were unable to give any effective resistance. The Swiss advanced
courageously from their hiding places and enclosed their enemies "just as
fish in a net and killed them without resistance [being offered]." 53 The
observation that the Habsburg forces were ensnared in groups helps clarify
how the Schwyzers and their allies fought the battle. Clearly, the Swiss
enjoyed some tactical flexibility in their units of 100, 200, and 300 troops,
and they may have used these sections to mass men at critical junctures to
dissect Leopold's column. Once the line of knights was broken into
51

Johann von Victring as cited in Liebenau, p. 24. "Duci introitum concesserunt ... et quasi
ibices de montibus scandentes [abides miserunt, plurimos occiderunt, qui se defendere neque
evade re ullo modo potuerunt." The account dates from 1340.
52
Justinger, p. 89.
53
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Animati et valde cordati contra eos descendunt de
latibulis suis et eos quasi pisces in sagena conclusos invadunt et sine omni resistencia
occidunt."
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sections, the Swiss easily surrounded these groups and destroyed them.
These tactics made sense because they allowed the Swiss to keep in close
proximity to each other, preserve unit cohesion, and maintain the ability to
deploy for further action. If the Schwyzers and their allies were simply
spread along the slopes, then the ability to redirect their activities would
have been lost once the initial onrush had been made.

Battle of Morgarten by E. Van Muyden

The Swiss used their halberds to cut down the knights, and they "slew
both lords and horses." 54 As platforms from which the cavalrymen could
fight, the mounts were also military targets. The Swiss so rapidly cut down
their enemies that Johannes von Winterthur stated, "It was not a battle but
only ... a butchery." Duke Leopold's men were just like "sacrificial animals
brought to slaughter." The Swiss spared no one, took no prisoners, and cut
down their enemies "without [class] distinction" (indifferenter ). 55 Social
divisions were often significant on the battlefields of Europe in this era
because many of the knights were wealthy, and these men were often taken
captive and held for ransom. In something like a gentleman's agreement,
54

Hans Gloggner's Zurcher Chronik as cited in Liebenau, p. 34. "Da warent switzer uf dem
berg und sluogen herren und ross."
55
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73. "Non erat pungna se tantum ... quasi mactatio."
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the upper classes were willing to take prisoners of their social equals hoping
for the same treatment in return. This meant that combat was less dangerous
for them than the men from the lower classes. By killing these knights
without consideration of status or wealth, the Swiss made a social as well
as a military statement.
The Schwyzers and their allies directed the initial attack against the
knights, the most-feared adversaries, but they also struck the men on foot.
Pressing their advantage, the Swiss rolled up much of the Habsburg column
by attacking down the line of marching men. Possibly, the Swiss also
attacked the enemy infantry near the lake at the same time they
overwhelmed the cavalry. Leopold's foot soldiers soon panicked, lost unit
cohesion, and any semblance of resistance rapidly crumbled. Another factor
in the loss of discipline among the infantry was the flight of the knights.
When the Swiss attacked the nobles, many of these men turned to run away
and trampled their own men killing many of them. "When the servants of
the Duke saw [the attack] they all turned back and fled from there. And the
first one to flee was Count Hainrich [Heinrich] von Montfort, the canon,
who killed many [of the Duke's] men [on foot] with [his] horses." 56 Only
the contingent of fifty men from Zurich made the mistake of attempting to
hold their position because they "did not want to flee" (woltend nitfliehen),
but their courage was misspent, and they were all killed in the onrush. Their
bodies lay close together (by einandren) or were piled upon each other. 57
The foot soldiers at the front of the column suffered the heaviest casualties,
and more men farther back survived. Only one man from the town of
Winterthur died because he got separated from the other men and joined the
nobles farther forward. 58
Desperate to save themselves from the onslaught of their adversaries,
the men in the Habsburg army tried to escape by retreating back up the
road. At times, the fleeing men were so pressed together in their panic that
"they could neither defend themselves nor flee." 59 The attack pushed many
men into the lake where they drowned being weighed down by clothing and
armor. Others jumped into the lake attempting to swim to the opposite shore

56

Ziirich Chronik ( 1428) as cited in Liebanau, p. 32. "Do das des hertzagen diener ersachent,
do kartent si sich all umb, undfluchent dahin, und der erst der flo ch, der war graff Hainrich
van Montfort, der corherr, der vil volks ertot mit den rossen." See al so Heinrich Brennwald
and Aegidius (Gilg) Tschudi as cited in Liebenau, pp. 47, 63 respectively.
57
Ziircher Chronik (1449) as cited in Liebenau, p. 35. See also, Gloggner as cited in
z
ig man."
Liebanau, p. 34. "Und verlurent die van ziirichfiin
58
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73.
59
Victring, as cited in Liebenau, p. 24. " Qui se def endere neque evadere ullo modo
potuerunt."
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and risked drowning rather than face the wrath of the Swiss. 60 The water in
November was very cold, and the lake was one mile (1.5 kilometers) or
more across, so few survived. The forty-five men fromAarau, who came by
boat, rushed to the vessel, but the craft sank under their weight, and they all
drowned. 61
While escape was difficult, many survived including Duke Leopold,
who evaded death because an aide saw an avenue of flight. "The Duke,
himself having been informed by one who had observed a path [to use to]
get away, escaped with difficulty." Leopold was fortunate, but his casualties
were heavy. In fact, "the flower of the army" (flos militie) had been killed. 62
"From each community, castle, and town there were many men killed and
because of that everywhere ... only the voice of crying and wailing was
heard. " 63 The names of over fifty prominent nobles who fell in the battle
were recorded in the Swiss books of remembrance (Jahrzeitbiicher), but
there may have been many more. Friedrich von Toggenburg, who may have
warned the Swiss of the approach of Leopold's army, was among the
dead. 64 The total number killed in the Habsburg Army was roughly 2,000
men. Johannes von Winterthur stated that 1500 had been killed by the
sword, but he added that this number did not include those who drowned.
Mathias von Neuenburg also wrote that 1500 men had fallen, and Twinger
von Konigshofen stated that roughly 1500 knights and their attendants and
500 infantry were also killed. 65
In comparison, the Swiss losses were few. One erroneous source
reported that the Schwyzers lost "no more than one man." 66 A careful
modern study has stated that seven men from Schwyz lost their lives, while
another seven men from the Uri and Unterwalden contingents were also
killed. 67 The victory for the Swiss at Morgarten was such a lopsided contest
that it may be considered among the greatest achievements in the entire
history of warfare.
~his is one of the best documented aspects of the battle see Justinger, p. 48, Johannes von
Winterthur, p. 73, and accounts by Stuhlmann, the Zurcher Chronik, Gloggner, and the
Bemer Konigshofen as cited in Liebenau, pp. 29, 33-4, 37 respectively.
61
Joachim von Watt (Vadian) as cited in Liebenau, p. 55.
62
Victring as cited in Liebenau, p. 24. "Dux ipse ex informatione cuiusdam, qui observabat
semitas exitus, vix evasit."
63
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73. "De singulis civitatibus castellis et oppidis plures
interemptifuerunt et idea ubique ... sola voxfletus et ululatus audita est."
64
The books of remembrance are found in Liebenau, pp. 81-5 and Oechsli, pp. 217*-19*.
65
Johannes von Winterthur, Mathias von Neuenburg, and Twinger von Konigshofen as cited
in Leibenau, pp. 210*-l l *. Twinger stated 150 gleves (anderhalp hundert glefen) or 1500
men had died.
66
"nit merdenn ain mann" Zurcher Chronik (1449) as cited in Liebenau, p. 35.
67
Sidler, p. 204.
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As a young boy in school, Johannes von Winterthur saw "with my own
eyes" (occulis meis conspexi) the men returning to Winterthur with some
anxiety because he feared for the life of his father. Johannes finally saw his
father, and, with great excitement, the boy ran to meet him in front of the
city gate. The young scholar also saw Leopold return after the battle, and
the Duke seemed understandably overcome with grief, worry, and
exhaustion. 68
While the battle of Morgarten destroyed one Habsburg army, the other
invasion force continued to advance on Unterwalden. The men of Schwyz,
and the contingent from U nterwalden that had fought at Morgarten, left the
battlefield rapidly to deploy against the remaining menace, but this effort
was unnecessary. Otto von Strassberg and his men had skirmished
insignificantly with enemy forces, but, when the leader received a glove or
gauntlet turned inside out, he knew that Leopold's army had been defeated
and immediately abandoned the campaign by withdrawing his troops. 69 But
Otto was among the casualties of these engagements. He suffered some kind
of internal wound (lesus intrinsecus) and soon died. 70
Once all threats of invasion had turned back, the Swiss returned to the
battlefield to plunder the enemy dead, no doubt gaining considerable wealth
in the process. The victors took weapons and armor from the fallen men and
horses, and they also retrieved corpses from the lake to take anything of
value from them. This effort was so thorough that few artifacts relating to
the engagement have been found on the battlefield. Scores of important
nobles had been killed, and their relatives retrieved many of these bodies to
inter them in family vaults. 71
Since the contest between the Swiss and the forces of Duke Leopold
was only a part of a much wider conflict, the hostilities continued after
Morgarten. However, the advantage had gone to the victors of the battle,
and they soon went on the offensive striking late in 1315 and in the spring
of 1316. The men of Unterwalden attacked Interlaken, and forces from
Schwyz also struck at Glarus largely for plunder. The Swiss and the
Habsburgs signed a series of armistices that ran from 1318 to 1323, which
effectively brought the fighting between them to an end. 72 Frederick von
Habsburg' s bid for the throne of Germany ended at the battle of Mtihldorf
in 1322 when he was captured by his enemies. Among the conditions of his

68

Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73.
Justinger, p. 49. "Ouch wart dem grafen von Strasberg ein Zetzer hentschuch gesent von
den herren die am morgarten entrunnen, davi er verstund, daz si am strit verloren hatten."
70
Matthias von Neuenburg as cited in Liebenau, p. 28.
71
Johannes von Winterthur, pp. 73-4.
72
Sidler, pp. 216-9.

69
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release in 1325 was the renunciation of Frederick's claim to the office of
Emperor. 73
On 9 Dec. 1315, only twenty-four days after the battle, representatives
of the Forest States concluded a defensive alliance at Brunnen in the state
of Schwyz. The "Brunnen Treaty" (Brunnen Vertrag) remains one of the
most important agreements ever made among the Swiss. It bound the three
states to cooperate on any military ventures, to come to one another's aid
in time of emergencies, to guarantee peace among the signers, and to assure
cooperation on all matters dealing with foreign powers. Significantly, this
accord would "remain eternally and continuously" (ewig und stete beliben)
binding on the states, and it is still in force today. 74 While the authenticity
of the Federal Charter of 1291 may be in question, the Brunnen Treaty
appears to be genuine. Although the existence of the Federal Charter was
unknown until the eighteenth century, the Brunnen Treaty has been
remembered since it was signed, and it may be the oldest authentic
agreement of an "eternal" nature among the Swiss. The victory at
Morgarten made the Brunnen Treaty possible, because the viability of
cooperation among the Forest States had been clearly confirmed. The
victors in the battle soon attracted the interest of other states nearby, and
Luzem joined the alliance in 1332 followed by Zurich ( 1351 ), Zug and
Glarus (both 1352), and Bern (1353). The Forest States and these new allies
formed the "Eight Old States" (Acht Alten Orte), which became the
configuration of the Swiss Confederation during most of the later Middle
Ages. These states, held together by the Brunnen Treaty of 1315 and later
alliances, maintained the viability of the Confederation allowing it
eventually to evolve into the modem Swiss nation.
In a stunning feat of arms at Morgarten, the free Swiss peasants
defeated a competent feudal army led by mounted knights in one of the
most lopsided battles in history. This victory was among the first of its kind,
and it signaled the development of infantries and the decline of cavalries in
the armies of Europe. Over the next two centuries, the Swiss would
continually demonstrate how free men could protect themselves and secure
their privileges by their military prowess.
Brigham Young University
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The Boat is Full: Swiss Asylum Denied. Markus Imhoof, Director.
Switzerland: 1981.
Das Boot ist voll (sometimes translated as "The Lifeboat is Full"),
directed by Markus Imhoof, is a notable accomplishment in Swiss cinema
of the late 20 th century. It received the Silver Berlin Bear for Outstanding
Single Achievement in 1981 at the Berlin International Film Festival, and
the following year it was nominated for an Academy A ward in the category
of Best Foreign Film. These honors presumably sprang not merely from
recognition of Imhoof' s courage in recalibrating the past, in putting an
alternate face on the Holocaust, and in documenting Swiss refugee policies
during the Second World War. These are all foundational aspects of the
film, true enough, but Imhoof' s unique artistry lies in the crafting of these
factors into a moving, personalized narrative. If we see a cinematic vision
of unfeeling bureaucracy amidst vacillating societal cowardice and bravery,
it is filtered through the lens of survival-or-Treblinka consequences for
identifiably vulnerable characters. Fictional peril, even when rolled out in
understated scenes free of sentimental treacle, still grabs us as viewers at a
visceral level, since we know that any Jew turned away and deported to
Germany is doomed. In its own fashion, this Swiss-German-Austrian
coproduction is a powerful and revelatory film on the Holocaust. The
production company's name, Limbo Films, gives an apt description for the
predicament of the protagonists.
World War II is
raging as the action
begins. The first
image we see, a
visual metaphor for
the film's central
theme of exclusion, is
of a train tunnel
being bricked
completely shut by
Swiss army troops to
prevent precisely the
type of refugee flight
Photo courtesy of Deutsche Akademie der KUnste, Filmarchiv
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into neutral Switzerland that next occurs. A mixed group of four Jewish
refugees, along with a German Army deserter and a French child, manage
to escape from a train that has made an unscheduled stop near the Swiss
border. The group finds temporary lodgings at the inn of Anna Fliickiger
(Renate Steiger) and her husband Franz (Matthias Gnadinger). Franz is not
enthused at receiving the newcomers, and he sends for the village
policeman, Peter Bigler (Michael Gempart), quoting radio reports that
"there are already enough of these people around." Anna is sympathetic to
the plight of the group and proactive in seeking out advice from the local
pastor (Klaus Steiger) on how the refugees can remain in Switzerland. To
maintain strict quotas (the year is 1942), the Federal Council had just
legislated away asylum for anyone who might be a refugee "on strictly
racial grounds." But families with children under six years of age, according
to another statute, are allowed to remain in the country: thus a "family" is
artificially constructed in which the "children" are the French boy instructed to act deaf-mute - and a Jewish girl, while the unlikely "parents"
are the German Army deserter ( Gerd David) and Judith (Tina Engel), a
Jewish woman who seems to be the group's de facto leader. Switching
clothing, Judith's teenage brother (Martin Walz) poses as the German
soldier. An unrelated elderly Jew from Vienna (Curt Bois) serves as
"grandfather" for the children. In a more innocent time, this posing and plot
twisting might serve as setup for a comedy of errors, but here the
undertones become increasingly tragic. The fabricated family unravels
under the suspicious gaze of Officer Bigler.
The fates of the asylum seekers are to be various, and the behaviors and
attitudes of even the host couple fluctuate and evolve, affecting the
outcomes. At the same time, the Swiss societal reactions portrayed in the
film serve as an inventory of what asylum relations may realistically have
looked like in wartime Switzerland. Individuals in the local village
population take on positive, negative, indifferent and neutral stances
through a wide spectrum of curiosity, callousness, anti-Semitism and
selfless generosity. For one set of citizens gossiping about the "knife
grinders" and questioning whether the strangers might be butchering cats,
an elderly couple offers a kind voice and some of their strictly rationed
groceries. Behind the local and social variables we see depicted in the film,
though, stand the calculating imperatives of the wartime Swiss state, which
mandated the return of an estimated 30,000 Jewish asylum seekers to
Germany and certain death. These laws served as rigid pretext for
unquestioning or xenophobic bureaucrats anxious to follow the letter of the
law so as not to complicate their lives or disturb their neighborhood.
One aspect not evident for English-language viewers relying on the
subtitles alone - an effect that strongly differentiates the would-be exiles
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol44/iss3/10
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from the local residents - is the use of language. The Swiss-German dialect
used by the village residents is folksy and geographically limiting, while the
refugees speak a standard High German that could be understood widely.
Not only does this demarcate citizens from "strangers," it also serves sociolinguistically at one point to underscore the gravitas of the Law: when the
village policeman iterates the paragraphs and points of asylum statutes, he
abandons his Swiss German for the legalese of High German.
Despite the melodrama and high pathos that Imhoof could have stirred
- given the potential for viewers' identification with innocents at risk- the
director chose a sober directness that functions well. The film tends more
to historical expose than to Anne Frank romanticism. Emotions are
addressed but not manipulated. There is no musical score designed to reach
for the heartstrings or to telegraph dramatic highpoints. Narrative action,
camera angles, believable dialogue and reactions are enough to tell the
story, even when Judith is tom from the arms of her gentile husband (Hans
Diehl) for the last time in a Swiss detention camp. Gruesome acts are
prefaced but not shown. Finger pointing and moralizing voiceovers are
avoided.
This reviewer is tempted to call forth Brecht's sense of epic theater to
explain the effect of The Boat is Full. This is not a stretch of the
imagination, since Imhoof did write his dissertation on Brecht. At times we
find ourselves wondering if the acting has turned a bit wooden or if an
alienation effect is being attempted. Certain scenes offer contrapuntal comic
relief that crosses the wires of emotion and logic: ham offered to the
refugees, the pastor's tailoring needs, training the French boy not to speak,
the old man's reasons for leaving on his yarmulke. While the film does not
utilize extreme Brechtian staging measures to calm catharsis, it does tend
to guide viewers to a similar place, leading them to question how the story
might have ended differently. The head becomes as involved as the heart.
Imhoof' s first film teacher, Leopold Lindtberg, himself a Jewish
refugee to Switzerland from Austria during World War II, had made a 1945
film, Letzte Chance (Last Chance) with a parallel theme: multinational
refugees to Switzerland. Shortly after his own film's appearance, Imhoof
revealed - thirty-seven years after the fact - that Last Chance had been
censored one day before its premiere to remove the implication that
refugees had experienced any difficulties in being accepted by the
Confederation. The Boat is Full, the screen version of a book by Alfred
Hasler, can thus be seen as a correction of cinematic as well as political
history.
At least two stages of reception for the film can be traced. Initial
controversy came following the film's release in 1981. There was
stupefaction, acceptance, but also widespread and often hostile reluctance
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by the Swiss to admit to complicity with Nazi Germany or to regard their
country - by whose flag the Red Cross had been inspired - as having
broken a long tradition of relief for the oppressed. Initially, the Swiss Film
Promotion office refused financial support. The second phase of reception
came at the tum of the millennium in the wake of the Bergier Commission,
which studied Switzerland's wartime past and issued a final report in 2002
condemning, among other things, the country's deportation of Jewish
refugees. By this time, partially as a result of the film, the Swiss were
confronting their past, and historical truth was trumping denial.
Between the two stages, in 1990, the last master copy of the film's
negative had been discovered in Rome, and a restoration process enhanced
colors, removed scratches, and, though unable to adjust completely for
excessive graininess, did make long-term digital preservation possible. The
currently available DVD features an interview with the director and a short
demonstration of the preservation results. A further wish would be to have
documentary material, such as video interviews with surviving Swiss
witnesses from the time.
For further reading, see Dennis Mahoney's review of the film,
"Personalizing the Holocaust," in Modern Language Studies, vol. 19, no.
1 (Winter 1989), pp. 3-11. Also see the Max Frisch play, Andorra, which
treats the topic allegorically. For a cinematic parallel, see Louis Malle's
masterful Au Revoir, Les Enfants.
Richard Hacken
Brigham Young University
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Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War.
Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War: Final Report.
Zurich: Pendo, 2002. 597 pp.
In December of 1996, bowing to foreign pressure and criticism
concerning the Swiss handling of dormant World War Two financial
accounts, the Swiss government mandated an investigation. The
Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War
(ICE) was given broad power to look into the scope and fate of assets
acquired during the Nazi dictatorship of Europe. This was an unprecedented
move that allowed private records to be viewed with scrutiny. Swiss
companies that had operated during the period in question were required to
allow access of their archives and banned from destroying any relevant
documents. After five years of research, twenty-five volumes of
information, and a broadening of its investigation to include other sensitive
issues, the ICE produced Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second
World War: Final Report. These almost 600 pages of self-assessment
contain a comprehensive accounting of Swiss proceedings relating to World
Warll.
Final Report is divided into three sections with a total of seven
chapters. Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) gives an introduction and historical
background of the research project. Of interest is the mandate that required
private companies to grant access to source material that had previously
been inaccessible to historical research. As such, the ICE was able to obtain
information that shed new light on Swiss financial practices albeit an
unfavorable view of Swiss cooperation with the German Reich. This new
atmosphere of openness to private records was short-lived however. After
the five years ended, the Swiss Federal Council decided to allow companies
to take back the photocopies used in the ICE's research, thus limiting any
further research and verification beyond the ICE' s findings.
Research was further limited due to inconsistent archival preservation.
For instance, by 1994 the Union Bank of Switzerland, which inherited the
archives of many smaller banks operating during the war years, had
destroyed 90% of the material transferred (38). Even the federal mandate
to preserve records didn't stop a Union Bank archivist from continuing to
shred their historical files. A security guard working for the bank rescued
some of these files and handed them over to a Jewish organization in
Zurich. This created a public outcry which revealed the almost
insurmountable opinions and repressed memory the ICE was up against.
Mr. Christoph Meili, the security guard, feared his life was in danger and
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fled Switzerland. Although a spokesperson for the bank later came forward
with a plausible explanation and claimed, " ... the public has a right to know
what we have," Never-the-less, she also stated that the documents would
not be made public and would only be available to the historian's
commission. 75 It is interesting to note that Mr. Meili, an average citizen,
recognized the importance of these particular historical documents but an
individual trained to work in the archives of a major bank and supposedly
informed of the injunction to preserve any and all war related financial files,
deemed them garbage.
Part II (Chapters 3 thru 6) is a summary and interpretation of the
commission's research. The third chapter is a critical review of the refugee
problems. The ICE claims that by closing the border and repatriating
refugees already within the country, "the Swiss authorities were
instrumental in helping the Nazi regime to attain its goals" (168). Also
addressed are the internal refugee camps, the problems associated with them
especially from the victims' perspective, the extent of understanding by
those in authority regarding persecution, and how Swiss policies on
refugees compared with other countries.
The ICE' s original mandate for research centered on the Swiss
involvement with Nazi gold and dormant bank accounts, thus the bulk of
Final Report is contained in Chapter 4 dealing with trade and asset
transactions. The commission's research makes clearly evident that Swiss
business and political dealings were favorable toward the Nazi regime. The
underlying motive in many cases was monetary rather than humane, and
many decisions were based on keeping the Swiss population supplied and
nourished. Such was the case in policies concerning rail transit, credit
extended to Germany, Aryanization of companies, the use of forced labor
in Swiss subsidiaries inside Germany, and handling of stolen securities and
assets.
The conflicts and problems that arose as a result of the Emergency
Plenary Powers Decree of August 30, 1939 and the establishment of the
Federal Council are addressed in Chapter 5, "Law and Legal Practice."
Through the Federal Council Switzerland failed to support their Jewish
citizens residing in German occupied lands. The J-stamp agreement was just
one of the measures reflective of what the ICE called," ... fluting of legal
and ethical principles in favour of opportunism and convenience ... " (400).
Although this chapter is fairly short, it explains the legal issues relevant at
the time, and how Switzerland applied international, public and private laws
throughout the war years. Instead of escalating control over political
75

Alan Cowell, "Latest Swiss Bank Surprise: Secrets From the Shredder," New York Times,
29 July 1997.
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activities, the Federal Council took a back seat and allowed private industry
jurisdiction over many political issues. Perhaps this is the best explanation
as to why the Swiss National Bank was able to continue gold transactions
with the Reichsbank even after it was evident the German assets were
acquired through a violation of international law. It may also explain why
in other aspects of Swiss war industry, decisions were made that manifested
economic importance as the paramount priority.
In Chapter 6 the ICE delves into post-war problems in dealing with
property rights and restitution. Historically, the Swiss believed themselves
completely neutral during the war, hence they not only rejected
Wiedergutmachung, they believed the country had done nothing for which
they needed to make amends. In the late 40s and early 50s criticism for
restitution took on anti-Semitic overtones with the president of the legal
commission for the Swiss banks claiming the Federation of Jewish
Communities only desired unclaimed assets for their own benefit (429).
This observation is ironic considering that early in 1997 anti-Semitism
surfaced again concerning a compensation fund to put an end to the
question of unclaimed accounts. Outgoing President Jean-Pascal Delamuraz
had to apologize for comments made in an end-of-term interview accusing
the World Jewish Congress of extortion and blackmail. 76 The ICE concludes
that the reluctance for Swiss authorities and businesses to recognize any
obligation of reparations has been an ongoing problem in dealing with the
question of property rights, and any restitution has come only through
external pressures.
Part III (Chapter 7) delves into the problems the Swiss face as they take
a more accurate look at their history. The ICE also point out limitations in
their research and areas worthy of further study. Switzerland enjoyed a
privileged role during the war years and has since needed to acknowledge
indecorous actions that contributed to that position. One may not
completely agree with all the conclusions reached by the ICE, such as their
belief that Switzerland had no impact on the duration of the war despite
evidence of financial cooperation and arms supplies to the Axis powers.
Nonetheless, the extent of research and compilation of materials brought
together by the commission is unparalleled.
For a German or French language researcher, the ICE' s previously
published 25-volumes are a treasure trove of World War II material. This
Final Report, however, is the only work that has been translated into
English, and as such, is invaluable for an English language historian delving
into Switzerland's sheltered past. The breath and depth of information is
76
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unequaled elsewhere, as is the candor and frankness with which the
commission addresses unpopular evidence. This book is not just a
compilation of facts and figures, but rather a review of the ICE's research
with footnotes and references to previously published material as well as
interpretations on their findings. The Final Report can be read as a whole,
or for someone wanting specifics, in independent sections. It is a book that
deserves shelf space of anyone with serious inquiry into Switzerland's war
years.
Joy Laudie
Utah Valley University
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James Joyce: The Last Journey by Leon Edel. NewYork: Gotham Book
Mart, 1947.

Although, James Joyce once
had to make a large deposit in a
Swiss bank to ensure that he and
his family would not become
welfare cases of the Swiss
government (Edel 33) - this was
in 1940 when Joyce and his family
fled Paris for Zurich - it's not the
city's financial reputation that is
the most important connection that
Zurich has to the life and work of
the author of Ulysses and
Finnegans Wake. Zurich, with its
deserved reputation as a
cosmopolitan haven for exiles, as
a center of medicine, and as the
birthplace of psychoanalysis,
provided Joyce with the refuge he
needed again and again during his
Zurich James Joyce Foundation
life as he sought artistic freedom
Joyce beside the Platzspitz in 1938.
and political asylum (from two
world wars), as well as periodic
relief from his encroaching blindness, and psychiatric help for his daughter
Lucia.
It was to Zurich that Joyce and Nora Barnacle went, for the first time,
on their "honeymoon" in 1904, following the promise of an English
teaching position that never panned out (however, it's likely that Joyce's
son, Giorgio, was conceived on that first visit to Zurich).
Then, it was to Zurich that Joyce and his family took refuge during
WWI, from July 1915 to October 1919. At that time, as much as one third
of the population of Zurich were foreigners, including Lenin (awaiting the
call to return to the revolution and bring new order out of chaos) and Tristan
Tzara (plotting his own revolt wherein Dada would create chaos out of the
old order).
As he sat in the Zurich cafes, surrounded by this international collection
of voluntary exiles and ex-patriots, artists and anarchists, Joyce tuned his
ear to catch phrases, slang, dialects, and even expressive street sounds that
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would later find their way into the onomatopoeic puns and word-puzzles in
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. For the first time in his life Joyce was
supported by grants and endowments that allowed him to devote more time
to writing, and so it was in Zurich that Joyce wrote most (and the most
important parts) of his novel Ulysses (while carrying on several romantic
liaisons in an effort to rekindle and sustain his creative muse). Zurich silk
manufacturer, Edmund Brauchbar, is generally thought to be the model for
Ulysses's Jewish protagonist Leopold Bloom.
Ten years later, Joyce again turned to Zurich. As Carola GiedionWelcker recalled, "Zurich had always brought ... [Joyce] luck in the past,
and once more he trusted his lucky-star and the spirit of the place" (260).
And so, in the 1930s, the Joyces again traveled frequently to Zurich for
relief from the eye trouble that plagued Joyce all his adult life, and in the
fruitless search for a cure for daughter Lucia (suffering from schizophrenia),
spending a small fortune on a score of specialists, including Carl Jung.
And, finally, it was back to Zurich in December 1940, that Joyce and
his family returned to escape the Nazi take-over of France (and here it was
that Joyce was required to make that large deposit in a Swiss bank before
he could enter the country, and appropriately it was Edmund Brauchbar,
Ulysses's Leopold Bloom, who immediately put up a portion of the money).
Less than a month later, suffering from a perforated ulcer, Joyce underwent
emergency surgery and died in Zurich on January 13, 1941, and was buried
(as was his wife, Nora, who remained in Zurich until she died 10 years later
in 1951) in Fluntern Cemetery. (The remains of Joyce and Nora were later
disinterred and moved to a permanent, side-by-side gravesite in 1966, and
the famous statue by Milton Hebald of Joyce sitting cross-legged and
smoking a cigarette was dedicated at the Joyces' new gravesite in 1981.)
So, now enter Leon Edel ( 1907-1997), Canadian-American biographer
and Henry James scholar (winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 1963 for his
biography Henry James), called "the foremost literary biographer of his
time" (Powers 113), one who "defined the genre literary biography and
distinguished it from other types of life writing" (114). Edel's small book
James Joyce: The Last Journey, creates a vignette of Zurich in the
immediate post-war months of late 1945, as seen through the eyes of an
American serviceman (Edel was an elderly first lieutenant in the U.S. Army
from 1943-1947), who also happened to be a accomplished literary scholar
(University of Paris, Docteur es Lettres, 1932, and Sir George Williams
University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, assistant professor of English,
1932-34).
In December 1945, Joyce had only been dead five years, and it's
unlikely that during those war years there had been many literary
pilgrimages made to Joyce's grave (#1449) in Fluntern Cemetery, so Edel's
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visit was perhaps the first in a soon-to-be long line of literary pilgrimages
to that corner of a foreign field that would be forever Dublin.
Brooding at Joyce's gravesite, Edel can't help but connect the snow and
ice on Joyce's headstone with the conclusion of Joyce's "The Dead" in
Dubliners, and the description of the lonely snowfall that covers the grave
of Michael Furey (14-15). Edel also appreciates the interruption of a
playful, sardonic Joycean dissonance to this graveside serenity as the church
bells of Zurich tolling their "Sunday summons" clash with a loudspeaker
that "suddenly began to blare Strauss waltzes," the "grating amplifier
robb[ing] them of all lilt and charm ... .It might have been the mechanical
piano at Bella's [Bella Cohen, the brothel-mistress in Ulysses]
accompanying the intonations of Stephen Dedalus" (15). Edel later muses
that the loudspeaker probably originated at the Zurich Zoo (22), and how
years before, when he was writing the portion of Finnegans Wake known
as The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies, Joyce walked with Eugene
Jolas near the Zoo one evening, and "enchanted Jolas by quoting to him
from the nocturne of Phoenix Park from the Mime, its mixture of puns and
poetry seeking to create the animal sounds dying in the gathering night"
(22). For Joyce, Zurich was a city full of puns just waiting to be decoded:
Jolas recalls for Edel how "'Joyce always used to say as he walked by ...
[the Limmat]: "See that! That's the Limit!""' (Edel 23). (Carola GiedionWelcker lists other puns of Zurich landmarks and festinvals that find their
way into Finnegans Wake (266).)
Through an introduction from Eugene Jo las, Edel meets Nora and
Giorgio Joyce, and hears from Nora the story of her husband's last days in
Zurich (23-24). Later that same evening, he visits with Carola GiedionWelcker (who met the Joyces when they arrived in Zurich in December
1940) and one of the doctors who attended Joyce during his final days, and
together they huddle in the room where Joyce had celebrated his last
Christmas, to listen to a recording of the author reading from Anna Livia
Plurabelle from Finnegans Wake (24-25).
Edel recounts the story of how the Joyces fled Paris in the final hours
before Nazi occupation, and how with his money tied up in Paris banks,
Joyce was unable to raise the deposit exacted by the Swiss government to
permit his son and grandson to enter the country with him (33). However,
the family eventually made it safely to Switzerland, and "[f]or Joyce the
return to Zurich appears to have been a great stimulant. It was a return to
the past. ... Memory met him at every corner. Here he had once taught
English at the Berlitz school, struggling to earn a living while writing some
of the finest pages of Ulysses. Here too he had, in later days, written
sections of Finnegan" (35). It was as if Odysseus had come home for a few
last days of peace before the end: "[h]e was happy to walk again the length
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of the Bahnhofstrasse .... A quarter of a century earlier the street had
inspired the poem "Bahnhofstrasse" included in Pomes Penyeach" (35-36).
In describing Joyce's funeral and the eulogists, Edel makes a point of
noting the worthiness of German kultur (keep in mind Edel is writing in
1946), and the softening of the British establishment towards the proto-Irish
Joyce (again, Edel is writing before it was just assumed, as it is all too easy
to casually assume today, that Joyce was a genius and his novels are
masterpieces, yeah-yeah). Edel writes with the post-war innocence that
believed that literature was something vitally important - to understanding
each other, individually and internationally.
Edel' s short account is important, therefore, not for its accumulation of
documentation (Edel refers to very few outside sources), nor for its
blending of current Joycean literary criticism (Edel' s selection of anecdotes
and recollections predates the following decades when the study and
deciphering of Joyce's work would subsequently become a full-blown
industry), but Edel's book is important for its innocence and immediacy,
and the simplicity with which it tells its story in the mood of post-war
consciousness. A time-capsule, it is genuine if a little dated and naive.
Literary biographies of Joyce have since been done more thoroughly, if not
better, but Edel' s was one of the first, and shows that reminiscence is alright
when it comes to beginning the portrait of an artist. Edel recognized that his
sketch was merely the beginning when he admitted "[i]t was only when I
was leaving Zurich that I realized that I had heard, in a fragmentary fashion,
what amounted to the last, the as yet unwritten, chapter of James Joyce's
biography. These then are the notes for such a final chapter" (25).

Robert S. Means
English Language & Literature Librarian
Harold B. Lee Library
Brigham Young University
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Thomas Moore, School for Genius - The Story of the ETH, The Swiss
Federal Institute ofTechnology,from 1855 to the Present. New York: Front
Street Press, Rockville Centre, 2005. xii + 274 pp., 51 photographs and
illustrations. ISBN 0-9725572-2-9. $23.95.
In various rank listings of the world's
universities most of the top places are
occupied by institutions in the English
speaking world. The Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich is one of the few
breaking into these prestigious positions.
(The sister institute in Lausanne is much
younger and smaller, hence did not yet have
time enough to grow to fame.) However, in
many people's view, ETH in Zurich is not as
well known in the United States as it should
deserve. Because we live in an era when
many American universities are expanding
their international programs, it was fortunate
that some people, among them ETH alumni,
interested in furthering cultural relations
between Switzerland and the United States,
took the initiative for a publication about this famous school. This endeavor
may be considered somewhat as a belated birthday gift for its 150th
anniversary. A former U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, Faith Whittlesey,
who is now president of the American Swiss Foundation, was particularly
instrumental in launching this project and in finding in Thomas Moore a
well qualified writer to produce this book. She also contributed a foreword,
which shows her great insight into Switzerland and love for this country.
The book's title reflects the fact that 21 Nobel Prize winners were or are
in various ways connected with the ETH. Some have been alumni, as
Wilhelm Rontgen, the discoverer of x-rays, others were on the faculty, as
Albert Einstein, who also was an alumnus, and others received their prize
later, after they had left, as the chemist Peter Debye. In addition, among the
geniuses are many engineering alumni or faculty members, e.g. the two
bridge builders Othmar Ammann, who designed in New York the George
Washington Bridge and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, and Christian
Menn, the architect of the Zapkin Bridge spanning the Charles River in
Boston.
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Thomas Moore does not claim to be a historian, but he certainly is a
gifted writer. Hence, a considerable part of his work is based on secondary
sources, which are listed in an appendix. In addition, the author interviewed
many faculty, students and administrators of ETH. The first chapters present
a survey of Swiss history and the development of its political system, that
in 1848 resulted in the political structure of today's Switzerland. The
intellectual and economical interaction of Switzerland with its neighbors,
and especially the industrial revolution, made the establishment of a
technical school a priority. Obviously, there was competition among the
cantons where the school should be built. The object was to create
immediately a first-class institution similar to German technical universities
with faculty collected from all over Europe. Several were Germans living
in exile due to the political unrest in Germany, among them the eminent
architect Gottfried Semper, who also designed the school's main building
and the astronomical observatory that still are in use.
The Federal Polytechnic School (later changed to the present name)
started in 1855 with teachings in architecture, engineering, sciences,
agriculture, forestry and humanities. Pharmacy at the beginning was
incorporated in the school for technical chemistry, whereas mathematics
and science were primarily taught to train teachers in these fields. In later
years, the Swiss army called for a military academy which was attached to
the ETH. When it opened its doors, the administration had assembled a
faculty of 32 professors and a number of auxiliary lecturers. During the first
decades the students were treated somewhat as if they were still in
secondary school.
The author describes the growth of the school, the changes in its
structure and its influence and interaction with the rapidly growing Swiss
industry. The whole country needed highways, railways, bridges and
tunnels, machines and electricity. Quite a bit of space is devoted to the
achievements of faculty and alumni in science and engineering.
After World War II the school expanded rapidly, so that the quarters in
the midst of the city had become too crowded. Therefore, land for a new
campus was acquired on the Honggerberg on the outskirts of Zurich. Most
of the sciences, as well as building science and architecture, are now located
there.
Of special interest for many readers is an extensive account of the ETH,
as it is today and will be in the future. We also learn a bit about student life
and that the student body comprises over 12,000 undergraduate and
graduate students; nearly one third are female, and about one fifth are from
foreign countries. The tuition for Swiss and also for foreign students is only
about a thousand dollars per year. The last part of the book gives an outlook
about the future developments. The project of a "science city" is particularly
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notable, with dormitories, apartments for students, faculty, staff and
visitors, as well as shops, a hotel and restaurants.
It is in the nature of such a book, which was written to make this
technological university known to a wider American public, that a bit of
hagiography was infused here and there, or that not so favorable instances
were omitted. For example, Einstein got appointed as professor only
through considerable pressure from outside, against the strong opposition
by the president and some of the faculty! Neither is mentioned that he did
stay only for three semesters, before he left for Berlin. The book also
devotes nearly three pages to the famous psychologist Carl Gustav Jung,
although in fact his ties with ETH were quite loose. He only lectured one
or two hours per week without drawing a salary from the ETH, although it
gave him the title of professor.
It also would have been helpful, if a few people at ETH had read
carefully the manuscript to eliminate some errors. For example, Paul
Scherrer was not a theoretical, but an experimental physicist. Also, because
the ETH received the right to award doctoral degrees only in 1908,
Rontgen, although he had done all his studies at ETH, had to submit his
dissertation in 1869 at the university of Zurich to obtain his Ph.D., not as
stated at ETH. Such slight errors and distortions should not weigh heavily
against the considerable value of this most informative book, which
contains many interesting photographs. Anybody who wants to learn about
this superb technological university, should read this well written work.
Students who may contemplate to study at ETH will find the discussion
about possible problems and benefits very useful. The readers will not only
get some insight about this school, but also about relevant aspects of Swiss
political and industrial life and history. Because the American Swiss
Foundation felt that this book should find a place in many university
libraries, it has donated to them a great number of copies.
Heinrich A. Medicus
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, NY
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Solzhenitsyn's Lenin in Zurich Re-Considered. Translated by H.T. Willotts.
London: The Bodley Head, 1976. Cloth. 256 pp. Ex Libris. New York: Hill
and Wang, 1976. ISBN-10: 0809604825. ISBN-13: 978-0809604821.
The recent death of Alexander Solzhenitsyn on August 3 rd of this year
might prompt a fresh look at that writer's oeuvre. While Solzhenitsyn is
mainly associated with well known works, such as One Day in the Life of
Ivan Denisovich and The Gulag Archipelago, one should not neglect his
less widely known books. Among those is his Lenin in Zurich. This volume
should be of particular interest to readers engaged with all things Swiss,
given its overt subject matter. One learns much about Switzerland in the
early years of the last century as a major locus for Russian emigres.
Solzhenitsyn deals not just with the sectarian debates within Bolshevik and
Menshevik circles but fleshes out more broadly the entire Marxist spectrum
in Switzerland during that time period, ranging from moderate Swiss Social
Democrats all the way to Lenin's radical and unyielding revolutionary
ethos. In addition, Lenin in Zurich also provides important insights into the
mind of one of the 20 th centuries most enigmatic writers and
literary/philosophical intellectuals, namely the mind of Solzhenitsyn
himself.
In addition to the obvious subject matter of Lenin and his years in
Switzerland, Solzhenitsyn also parades a remarkable array of fascinating
individuals around the Bolshevik leader. Chief among them are the highly
influential and complex Karl Radek ( 1885-1939) and Alexander Parvus
(1867-1924). It is arguable that with out their collaboration, Lenin would
not have succeeded in bringing himself and the Bolsheviks to power, and
thus the Soviet Union might never have happened. Of course, Solzhenitsyn
could not avoid the temptation to delve into Lenin's family and romantic
life, as it developed into the menage atrois between Lenin's wife N adezhda
Krupskaya (1869-1939) and the spirited Inessa Armand (1874-1920). In
a pivotal moment of the book, Solzhenitsyn even compares Lenin to that
most famous and unyielding Swiss Protestant Huldrych Zwingli
(1484-1531), whose single-minded pursuit of a Cause makes the two
otherwise very unlike thinkers and polemists alike in some ways. If a search
is limited to Russia, a more favorable comparison would be between Peter
the Great and Lenin, as both were W estemizers with considerable vision,
bringing change and reform to Russia. ( 166)
Solzhenitsyn expects his readers to be more or less familiar with this
dazzling set of characters who crossed Lenin's path in Switzerland. He
weaves his story with the literary skills that we have come to expect from
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this indefatigable critic of Soviet oppression. It bears underscoring that
Solzhenitsyn was not just a courageous anti-Soviet dissident but also a
deeply convinced Slavophile and Russophile, whose world view was
constructed with bold strokes that did not easily lend themselves to
ambivalence and a searching exploration of complexity. 77 This is both the
book's ultimate strength and simultaneously its greatest weakness.
Solzhenitsyn was a great simplifier, also when it came to Lenin, whom he
demonizes in interesting and perhaps somewhat disturbing ways. While
there is much that can and should be said against Lenin's self-righteous
temper and tyrannical treatment of those who disagreed with him on
fundamental issues, let alone the murders he condoned, one dimensional he
was not. Solzhenitsyn's ideological agenda, of illustrating how the Soviet
experiment was reckless and tyrannical not just since the distortions of
Stalinism but since its very inception by Lenin, informs much of Lenin in
Zurich
The historian Robert Service reminds us, in his well-considered and
well documented Lenin biography, that reductionism and oversimplification
might bring certain comforts of certainty to their proponents but ultimately
do not advance our knowledge.
In trying to kill [Lenin] off, many anti-Leninist historians in Russia
have opted for the weapons traditional among many Western writers.
Nearly always this is attempted by representing him in a mono-dimensional
way. Lenin the state terrorist. Lenin the ideologue. Lenin the party boss or
the writer or even the lover." 78
Given the seemingly perennial human interest in Romantic love and its
entanglements, Solzhenitsyn showcases the relationship between Lenin,
Lenin's wife Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, and Lenin's intimate
friend and close associate Inessa Armand. This truly complex relationship
becomes another tool for Solzhenitsyn to show Lenin as a deeply flawed
man. He portrays the Bolshevik leader as opportunistic and calculating in
his relationships with these two women, while not really exploring the
complexities inherit in them. In addition, Solzhenitsyn employs certain
rather ungenerous cliches, especially when it comes to Lenin's wife
Nadezhda/Nadia. She suffered from Graves' disease, which accounted for
77

Solzhenitsyn not only expects his readers to be familiar with the characters but also the
events that transpired before Lenin's return to Russia, for example the importance of Lenin's
changing alliances while considering which country's socialist party would be host to the
revolution. At various times in the book, Lenin believes and convinces those around him that
Switzerland is the place for the revolution and socialism, and at others, he opts for Russia
or Sweden.
78
Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Cambridge/Massachusetts: The Belknap press of
Harvard University Press: 2000), 493.
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her physical transformation from a once very beautiful and attractive
women to her appearance of later years. The symptoms of Grave's disease
include not only a severe disruption of the menstrual cycle but also a
tightening of the neck and bulging of the eyes. In addition to carving out her
unfortunate physical features, Solzhenitsyn frames Nadia's intellect in
equally unflattering terms. In essence, Solzhenitsyn's version of Nadia is
that of a modest woman with much to be modest about, including an
uncritical devotion to her husband, for whom she performs secretarial
services as his intellectual inferior. While this description of their
relationship is somewhat correct, it also very much glosses over the
intellectual abilities of Nadia, who wrote several works on pedagogical
theory and was drawn to Tolstoy's theories on education long before she
met Lenin. Nadia particularly focused on Tolstoy's sense of allowing the
free development of each child and student as well as the importance of
developing a positive and nurturing teacher-student relationship. She also
worked tirelessly fighting illiteracy and improving the Soviet library
system, after the Bolsheviks sized power in 1917 in the old Russian Empire.
The beautiful and precocious Inessa Armand is presented in more
nuanced terms by Solzhenitsyn, who nevertheless instrumentalizes her to
discredit Lenin. With some measure of empathy, Solzhenitsyn observes that
[a]ll the men and women that Lenin had ever met in his life he had valued
only if, and as long as, they were useful to the Cause. Only Inessa, although
she had entered his life through the Cause - and there was no other way, no
outsider could ever get near him, - existed as if for him alone,
complementing his existence with her own. Inessa revealed to him things
he would never have thought of, never imagined, and might have lived
without discovering ... Long ago, when the whole world was carefully
measured, appraised and regulated, she had shaken his certainties, bidding
him break bounds and follow her through a world which was the same yet
unlike anything he had imagined, and he had gone with her, like a timid but
delighted schoolboy, anxiously clinging to her guiding hand, full of
childlike, doglike gratitude towards her, worshipping her right down to the
blue veins of her slender foot for all she had revealed to him, and made to
last as long as her love for him." (70-71)
One cannot help but be amazed at Solzhenitsyn's ability to combine a
deep and poetic understanding of what drew Lenin to Inessa with his galling
sarcasm for Lenin's devotion to her. Lenin's "doglike" attachment
amounted, according to Solzhenitsyn, to him showering her with attention
and letters, while she responded more sparsely. Historian Dimitri
Volkogonov, who shares Solzhenitsyn's strong dislike for Lenin as a
thinker, politician, and even human being, offers a significantly more
complex version of the relationship between Lenin and Inessa. Emphasizing
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how well-educated Insessa was (being fluent not only in Russian and
French but English as well), she devoured Russian and French philosophy
early on, especially Rousseau. She published on feminism, free love, and
a range of other topics, which may have equally intrigued and disturbed
Lenin. Volkogonov, who had more detailed access to arc hi val holdings than
Solzhenitsyn on the matter, argues just the opposite, pointing out that Inessa
often wrote to Lenin, lovingly-impatiently calling for swifter responses. 79
Volkogonov understood that "Inessa had been perhaps the brightest ray of
sunshine" in Lenin's life. 80 This assessment differs from the way that
Solzhenitsyn frames the relationship; he, as a Russian nationalist and
Slavophile par excellence, in all likelihood was not immune to a fair degree
of masculine sexism. In this light, perhaps the greatest insult, in a culture
that valued masculinity as a virtue in and of itself, is the diminishment of
one's manhood in slavish devotion to a woman.
Alexander Parvus, alias Dr. Helphand, was one of the most intriguing
and complex figures in Lenin's proximity. He managed to combine his
deeply felt Marxist critique of capitalism with immense talents as a business
man and financial wizard. Advising not only Lenin and the Bolsheviks but
also the Young Turks and the Imperial German government, Parvus
managed to become a wheeler and dealer, with his fingers in many pies.
Naturally, this did not only gamer him friends. Born as Israel Lazarevich
Gelfland in the small Jewish settlement Berezino in Belarus, Parvus grew
up in the famous Ukrainian harbor town of Odessa and entered politics at
a young age. Associating with the Jewish Bund, which had great appeal to
Russian-Jewish intellectuals with socialist leanings, he was introduced early
on to revolutionary activities. Parvus, a man of many identities, left Russia
for Switzerland. Eventually settling in Zurich, Parvus earned his credentials
as a Doctor of Philosophy in 1891 and moved to Germany, where he
befriended a variety of Marxist theoreticians and activists, like Rosa
Luxemburg and eventually Lenin himself. Parvus met the latter in 1900 in
Munich and was as impressed with Lenin's intellect as Lenin was with
Parvus' most original mind. In fact, it has been frequently asserted that
Parvus first came up with the idea of starting a socialist revolution by trying
to transform a foreign war into a internal revolt, which then would tum into
revolution. Both Lenin and Trotsky were to develop this further. When
Revolution broke out in Russia in 1905, Parvus - at that time an associate
of Leon Trotsky - moved to St. Petersburg and was arrested for his
activities against the Tsarist government. Parvus, who was sentenced by the
79

Dimitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 28-49,
especially 42.
80
Ibid., 49.
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Russian Imperial government to three years of exile in Siberia, managed to
escape to Germany and eventually took up residency in Istanbul, where he
made a large fortune supplying the Turkish army with food and advising the
Turkish nationalists. It was in Istanbul as well that Parvus forged close ties
with Baron Hans von Wangenheim, the German ambassador there. Von
Wangenheim was of course no supporter of Parvus' socialist dreams but
saw potential in undermining Russia, which since August 1914 was at war
with Germany. Both men found common ground in trying to destabilize
Russia by showering the Bolsheviks under Lenin with considerable
financial and logistical support. As the source of Lenin's money, he is
portrayed as an unfavorable character kept only for resources and powerful
connections. Their relationship's dynamics can perhaps be seen in Parvus'
incorrect assumption that his meeting in Switzerland with Lenin would be
successful. 8 1 One of the chief components of the deal arranged between
Parvus and the Imperial German government was to offer Lenin safe
passage from Switzerland through Germany in order to get him to Russia.
Parvus, whose reputation in Marxist circles had been compromised for
several years, due to his Machiavellian approach to politics as well as his
fabulous personal and seemingly very capitalistic wealth, ultimately
succeeded in convincing Lenin that a temporary Bolshevik-German alliance
could be mutually useful.
Solzhenitsyn's personal dislike for multi-faceted characters like Parvus
translates into how he portrays him. The Polish-American historian Richard
Pipes, whose distaste for socialist Utopianism of any sort is well known and
thus cannot be seen as idealizing Parvus, reminds his readers in his eulogy
of Solzhenitsyn, published in the St. Petersburg Times on August 7 th , 2008,
that "Solzhenitsyn depicts Helphand-Parvus as a slimy character who tries
to persuade Lenin to return to Russia and start a revolution. " Pipes very
perceptively links this one-dimensional and rather ungenerous description
of Parvus to Solzhenitsyn's knee-jerk anti-Semitism, indeed "a common
vice of writers of the conservative-nationalist persuasion in Russia." Slimy,
scheming, cunning, and ruthlessly opportunistic are the descriptors that
Solzhenitsyn used in carving out his vision of Parvus. One typical segment
reads "Parvus, however, in spite of his exquisite ugliness, could be
captivating. The German ambassador in Copenhagen ... enchanted by
Parvus's incomparable intelligence, was his already." (136).
Solzhenitsyn casts another close associate of Lenin in somewhat similar
terms; Karl Radek is framed as the constantly scheming intellectual, "with
his black whiskers that run from ear to ear under his chin, with his horn81

Frequently in the book Parvus is portrayed as more of a methodical businessman and Lenin
the ideological thinker and dreamer.
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rimmed glasses, his quick glance and his buck teeth, restlessly switching his
eternally smoking black pipe from comer to comer of his mouth ... " (42)
Solzhenitsyn's Lenin notes that [w]hen Radek was nice he was really nice,
a super-pal. At present there was no living without him. And how well he
spoke and wrote German! He took the sharpest bends in the road with ease
- there was no need to waste time explaining. A scoundrel, but a brilliant
one - such people were invaluable. (43)
When Lenin announces to his rather surprised listeners that this most
bourgeois and laid-back country of Switzerland, is to become the center of
world revolution, Radek is not horrified by Lenin's strange misjudgment
but rather takes it as an intellectual challenge, where real lives become
pawns to his sense of intellectual adventure and strategic playfulness,
disregarding the human costs. "Radek wriggles, licks his lips, and
excitement flashes behind his glasses: if that is the way of it, what fun he
will have." (55).
Radek, a polyglot intellectual, gifted journalist, and polemicist, was
born as Karol Sobelsohn in Lemberg, when it was still part of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Like Parvus, Radek's Jewish background made
him an outsider, and he put great hope into the socialist movement as a way
to overcome mainstream anti-Semitism. After some involvement with the
Polish Social Democrats, Radek moved to Germany and joined its SPD
there. Again like Parvus, Radek came to know and admire Rosa Luxemburg
as well as other leading Marxist intellectuals and politicians. When World
War I broke out, he moved to Switzerland and became part of Lenin's inner
circle and ended up, together with Parvus, negotiating the deal with the
German General Staff that got Lenin safely through Germany in a sealed
train. Just like Solzhenitsyn's interpretation of Parvus, his portrait of Radek
leaves out a great deal. He does not show us why both men, who
doubtlessly possessed unusually sharp and unorthodox minds, were drawn
to the Marxist dream of a society free of exploitation. And Solzhenitsyn
fails to illustrate how and why both Parvus and Radek were complex and
contradictory beings, who might perhaps have truly believed in the
workability of a socialist society that safeguarded not merely social justice
but individual liberty as well.
Stefan Heym, one of former East Germany's most popular dissident
socialists, with a strong interest to defend the dream of a better society
beyond capitalism against the frequently tyrannical and narrow-minded
GDR Communist regime, also tried to come to terms with Radek, Parvus,
and even Lenin. In his novel Radek, published in German in 1995, Heym
develops both his protagonist Radek and Parvus as human beings of flesh
and blood, who lived through the first parts of the violent and barbarous 20 th
century, trying in their own imperfect ways to bring about a better future.
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They were hopeful and idealistic, narcissistic and vain, brilliant and naive
all at the same time and ultimately paid a high price for their role in shaping
the events which ultimately turned against them. For while Parvus was
shunned by Lenin and the Bolsheviks after he helped bring them to power
and ultimately died a lone and disappointed man in his thirty-two room
Berlin mansion, Radek was condemned by Stalin in one of the Soviet
Union's show trials to a ten year hard labor sentence in a Gulag, where he
was most likely murdered by the NKVD. The difference between Heym's
characterizations and Solzhenisyn' s stand in stark contrast and seem to
reflect important differences in the passions and beliefs of the people whose
lives were directly touched by the consequences of Lenin's efforts and
vision.
Solzhenitsyn's evaluation of Lenin in Lenin in Zurich provides readers
with the opportunity to look into his mindset regarding Lenin, the other the
players who helped to shape the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the years
preceding. As Solzhenitsyn's personal beliefs take center stage, the book is
a valuable interpretation. It should be of particular interest to those
interested in the pivotal events relating to the Russian Revolution and their
development in Switzerland, since the majority of the book is set there.
Axel Fair-Schulz and Katherine French
State University of New York at Potsdam

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol44/iss3/10

48

et al.: Full Issue

SAHS APPLICATION FORM
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Phone_____ Fax_ _ _ __
Email: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Dues:

_ _Individual $50.00 per year
_ _Institution $75.00 per year
_ _Student $25.00 per year
_ _ Life Membership $500.00

Make check payable to: SAHS
Mail this form, with your check to:
Ernest Thurston
Membership Secretary
65 Town Mountain Road
Asheville, NC 28804
e-mail: eswisst@bellsouth.net
* Membership in the Swiss American Historical Society is open to all.
Members will receive each year three copies of the extremely interesting
Swiss American Historical Society Review, a personal copy of each book
published by the Society, and an invitation to attend the national meeting
of the Society, held consecutively in Philadelphia, New York and
Washington. At these national meetings members will have the
opportunity to meet fellow Swiss Americans and scholars in the fields of
Swiss and Swiss American History, Political Science, International
Relations, French, German and English Literature, Art, Music, Religion
and Philosophy, and will have the opportunity to establish new
friendships and professional relationships.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2008

49

American Historical
Society Review, Vol. 44 [2008], No. 3, Art. 10
SWISS AMERICAN Swiss
HISTORICAL
SOCIETY
65 Town Mountain Rd. • Asheville, NC • 28804

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol44/iss3/10

l

PRST STD
US Postage Paid
Permit No. 76
Camden, ME

j

50

